Even if hungry tigers do not eat grass

There are two sayings in Tamil about the four - legged tiger or “puli” . One is “Puli pathunguvathu paaivathatku” (The tiger crouches only to pounce).

The other is “Puli pasithaalum pullai thinnaathu” (Even if hungry tigers do not eat grass).

The essence of this proverbial wisdom can be applied to the two - legged tigers too. Past history of The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) demonstrates that.

If the LTTE is unusually quiet for a while people suspect that the tigers are plotting a surprise operation. A sudden strike is imminent it is felt. Likewise however much the tigers are hard - pressed the LTTE does not give up or change its policies easily.

It is against this backdrop that last week’s audacious assault by the LTTE on the Sri Lanka Air Force base at Anuradhapura needs to be viewed.

Recent events led to an impression that the LTTE was on the decline . Aggressive propaganda by the Rajapakse regime contributed greatly to this opinon being moulded.

The tigers had lost the East completely; they gave up Mannar South without a fight;they were hard - pressed on multiple fronts in the North having to face limited millitary offensives continuously;tiger controlled areas were being regularly bombed and shelled and claims were being made that LTTE targets were severely hit ; Colombo and other areas in the South were quiet and memory of past tiger operations were waning; coordinated action by several western governments against key tiger activists was constricting fund raising abroad ; successful strikes by the navy against LTTE ships were being regularly reported.

In such a situation the Government of Sri Lanka’s (GOSL) boasts that the tigers were on their last legs found many believers.Some observers of the LTTE - including this writer - found it difficult to accept this dominant line of thought. The tigers were down but certainly not out they stated. It was only a matter of time before the LTTE launched a counter - offensive or counter - strike they felt.

This prediction came true on Monday October 22nd!

Twenty - One black tiger commandoes engaged in a nocturnal assault on the Air Force base at Saliyapura, Anuradhapura. They dominated the base for nearly eight hours and destroyed several aircraft. In what was described as a co-ordinated land and air attack two planes of the LTTE’s nascent air force dropped bombs too. 14 security forces and all 21 tigers were killed.The greatest casualty was the image propagated by the GOSL that the LTTE was a spent force!

The tigers are engaged in asymmetrical warfare against the GOSL security forces. The LTTE is at a disadvantage vis a vis the GOSL in manpower, airpower, seapower, firepower, armour power etc. Given this imbalance the tigers would prefer to fight a defensive war rather than go on the offensive. What is important for the LTTE is the retention of some territory at least as a “rear “base. But the security forces are knocking at the gates. So the tigers need to conduct some guerilla strikes at least and reduce the military threat.

With this overall objective in mind , LTTE supremo Velupillai Prabakharan , has set in motion plans for many military projects. Preparations were - and are - on for several guerilla operations. One such strike was “Operation Ellalan” named after the Tamil monarch who reigned in Anuradhapura for 44 years .

A group of twenty - five “black tigers” were given specialised training for the “operation Ellalan” project for nearly six months. The squad studied maps and models of the Saliyapura Air base without being told it was at Anuradhapura. Elaborate reconnaissance missions known as “recce” had gone on for more than a year. Information and knowledge had been carefully gathered, processed, checked and confirmed.Attack motions were carefully rehearsed and simulation exercises conducted.

This team of black tigers was put together from different branches of the LTTE. They had all volunteered to become “Karumpuligal” (panthers) or suicide cadres. After being selected for a specific mission the black tigers are given specific training required for the particular mission. The “Ellalan operation” cadres got training at a secret location of the Lt. Col Rayan academy for tiger special forces. The project co-ordinator was a senior leader whose nom de guerre is Kalaikone.

21 of the 25 were picked as the final team after training was over. Tiger leader Prabakharan met the team for a meal in the second week of October. He posed for photos with the cadres destined for death. The photos are released after the operation is over. Usually LTTE cadres are promoted post- humously.

But in a departure from this practice black tigers are told of their posthumous promotions and given their new ranks while alive. This may be a method to enthuse cadres and attract more volunteers for the black tigers.

The pseudonyms, real names, new ranks and their districts of origin are stated below:

Lt. Col. Veeman (K. Pratheepan) from Trincomalee , Captain Panchaseelan (S.Kajendran) from Batticaloa ,Major Kanikkeethan (R. Kandasamy) from Batticaloa ,Lt. Col. Ilangko (R. Paheerathan) from Jaffna ,Major Mathivathanan (B. Thayaaseelan) from Jaffna ,Captain Puradchi (S. Thanushan) from Jaffna ,Major Supan (K. Jeevakanthan) from Jaffna , Major Ilampuli (T. Kalairaj) from Jaffna , Captain Pukazhmani (T. Puvaneasvaran) from Jaffna ,Captain Eezhaththeavan (T. Moasikaran) from Jaffna ,Major Ezhilinpan (V. Pirapaharan) from Jaffna ,Captain Pulimannan (K. Nanthakumar) from Jaffna , Captain Senthooran (K. Thinesh) from Jaffna , Lt. Arun (P. Thivaakaran) from Jaffna ,Captain Eezhappiriya (K. Keethanchali) from Jaffna , Capatain Arivumalar (S. Uthaya) from Jaffna ,Captain Tharmini (K. Nirmala) from Ki’linochchi ,Major Kaavalan (S. Saththiyan) from Ki’linochchi ,Captain Karuveanthan (M. Satheeskumaar) from Ki’linochchi , Captain Anpukkathir (V. Thileepkumar) from Mullaiththeevu and Captain Subesan (N. Maharaj) from Mannaar .

The mission commander was Paheerathan alias Ilango. His deputy was Pratheepan alias Veeman. Three of the squad were girls. Thirteen of the team were from Jaffna, three from Kilinochchi, two from Batticaloa and one each from Trincomalee, Mannar and Mullaitheevu districts. The senior most cadre was the squad’s commander Lt. Col Ilango who was 26 years old. He had joined the LTTE in 1995 and had participated in more than a dozen major battles including those of “Jayasikurui”. The junior was 17 year old Lt. Arun who was recruited in early 2006.

The black tiger team was asked to write letters to their loved ones on October 9th. These letters would be given to family members only after the operation was over. When family members read the “last” letters the person who wrote that epistle would not be among the living. The families would not have prior knowledge that their loved one had embarked on a black tiger mission.

Once D- day was finalised the black tigers would start off on their secret mission. Usually they would be accompanied and even guided by the intelligence wing members up to a point. Those involved in reconnaissance would take them to their destination and lodge them in “safehouses” for a while. They would have travelled lightly and would receive supplies and be given their arsenal shortly before H- hour.

It is believed that the “Operation Ellalan” squad travelled through jungle areas of Mannar - Wilpattu - Tantrimale -Anuradhapura etc to reach their target destination. Kajendran alias Panchaseelan was reportedly responsible for guiding his colleagues through jungle routes . Apparently he had travelled those routes earlier as preparation. Omanthai the norther province entry - exit point between GOSL and LTTE areas is about 60 km away from Anuuradhapura. The Saliyapura Air Force base is about 4 km from Anuradhapura city.

It is not clear as to where the tigers stayed in Anuradhapura prior to the attack. It is suspected that they used the grand “Gajaba Cross” motor show to mingle with nearly 100, 000 spectators who converged in Anuradhapura on Sunday October 21st. They had then allegedly proceeded from the Pillaiyar junction towards Nuwarawewa and reportedly walked by the tank bund. It is suspected that the black tigers hid themselves in a patch of shrub jungle bordering a small coconut grove before zooming on to their target.

It was around 2. 20 - 30 am in the early hours of Monday morning that the tiger squad crossed the Nelumkulama road and arrived at the North - Eastern side of the base.There is a three - tiered barbed wire fence. The outer and inner wires are quite thick while the thinner middle wire is electrified. The tigers cut through all three and entered without being electrocuted.. Apparently the power supply to the electric fence had been turned off earlier. Why this happened remains a suspicious mystery!

There was also a system of sound mines installed alongside the paths and also at strategic points. The tigers however seemed to know everything and swiftly de- commissioned them. Expansion work was on at the runway and mounds of earth and sand were heaped at a particular spot. The squad took cover behind those mounds and also moved their arsenal there. This spot became their field headquarters.

This arsenal consisted of T-56 ’s, Rocket propelled grenade launchers. Light Anti - tank weapons. multi - purpose machine guns, light machine guns, handgrenades etc. There was also a communications wireless operated by Thayalaseelan alias Mathivathanan. The black tigers used cellular phones to communicate among themselves during the operation.

The Anuradhapura air base is strategically important for a number of reasons. The biggest pilot training school is set up there. The aerial surveillance headquarters is also there.The base is home to the first flying training wing squadron; the sixth and seventh transport and training helicopter squadrons;the ninth attack helicopter squadron, the 11th UAV “drone” squadron and the 14th aerial surveillance squadron.

Several types of aircraft like the Beechcraft 200, RQ - 2 pioneer and IAI Scout Unmanned Aerial vehicles are kept here. These are used for Reconnaissance and maritime patrol; Mi 24 and Mi 35 “Hind” attack helicopters as well as Mi 17 and Bell 206 helicopters used for transport,training and logistic support are also stationed here. There also K - 8 Karakorum, Cessna 150 and Nanchang CJ6 primary training aircraft (PT6).

After the LTTE’s airwing sprouted wings the Anuradhapura air base gained greater importance. An elaborate radar system capable of monitoring the Northern skies and north - eastern seas has been installed. The Beechcraft is also of great utility value being capable of staying in the skies for marathon hours to monitor the seas. The Navy has benefited immensely. Anuradhapura base was the aerial surveillance headquarters apart from providing basic pilot training and also limited advanced training. It was also logistically important to ferry men and materials to and from the Mannar, Vavuniya and Weli - Oya/Manalaaru battlefronts.

With these strategic objectives in mind the tigers got to work. Zero hour was 3 am. The LTTE broke up into two main teams and began operations. Though the overall commander was Illango he headed a 7 member team. The second in command Veeman led a 14 member team. Both teams broke into smaller groups to implement specific duties.

The top priority was to mop up the four sentry points and two guard posts. This was done quickly. Thereafter the radar surveillance unit was seized and neutralised. The communications room was also knocked out.The other objective was to seize control of the air defence system and artillery units. Two 40 mm ,two 23mm artillery guns were seized . The 12.7 m anti aircraft guns were also taken. In 20 minutes the artillery and anti - aircraft guns , radars, communications and guard posts - sentry points were all taken over.

By this time sleeping airforce personnel were alarmed and began retaliating. There had been heavy partying on Sunday night due to the Gajaba cross motoring event and also because base commandant , Group captain Priyantha Gunasinghe was on the eve of retirement. Another diversion was the “Sri Laka Idol” program on Sirasa TV. Still airmen began responding bravely.

LTTE snipers climbed trees and began sniping at the elevated watchtower and command and control tower Flight Lt. Ruwan Kumara Wijeratna was killed near the tower. An Armoured Personnel carrier moved in blazing. A tiger cadre fired an anti - tank weapon at point blank range hitting the gunner and damaging the APC.

The three girls Eezhapriya, Arivumalar and Tharmini were trained in artillery. They took over the big guns and began firing them. Eehapriya apparently was a gunner of great ability. A tiger trio set up cut - out points at key positions and engaged in covering fire. Two tiger formations began to move into the hangars and destroy the helicopters , fixed wing aircraft and also the UAV drones. At least eight aircraft were totally demolished. Another nine were extensively damaged. Ten other aircraft damaged partially are in working condition.

Meanwhile the LTTE “control” in the Wanni was regularly informed of developments. Once it became known that the radars were knocked out and air defence system neutralised ,two small planes of the LTTE’s fledgling air wing started out from the Wanni. The airforce personnel saw the planes as they came close but were helpless as the anti - aircraft gun could not be used. The aircraft too could not be flown.

At this point of time A’pura base commandant informed Vavuniya commander Maj - Gen Upali Edirisinghe of the situation and tiger planes. Two Bell 212 helicopters set out from Vavuniya but friendly fire from a military camp in Mihintale hit one copter which crashed down at Doramadalawa about 11 km away from the Saliyapura airbase. All four crew were killed. The other copter turned back.

LTTE planes flew in and dropped two bombs each. One fell near the airbase hangar. The other three were dropped around the nearby army camp housing Gajaba regiment troops. One fell on a billet. One fell on the parapet wall surrounding a school and one fell on a field killing about 12 buffaloes. The idea apparently was to target the army camp and prevent soldiers coming to the aid of the airmen.

But the soldiers upon hearing of the tiger attack had set out from camp but were unable to do much because of the night’s darkness. They could not fire indiscriminately for fear of hitting the airmen. But the soldiers took up positions in the general area outside the camp and virtually surrounded it.

The bombing by tiger planes did not make any significant contribution to the assault on the air base apart from deterring troop movement for some time. Its symbolic effect however was immense. Taking possession of an air base. neutralising anti - aircraft guns and then bringing two planes to drop bombs over the very same base is well and truly an exercise of audacity.

The LTTE was showing that their nascent air force was still active and that the Sri Lankan security forces were incapable of restricting its movements in spite of boastful claims. The Lankan air force base was attacked by the Tamil Eelam air force was the message sought to be conveyed. Most media reports refer to the assault as a Land and Air co-ordinated attack. There was also confusion that the air attack preceded the ground attack.

A handful of tiger guerillas not only caused much destruction but also fought resolutely for nearly eight hours in the midst of the base. Two Gajaba special force contingents led by Major Chandimal Peiris and Capt Kosala Munasinghe arrived at daybreak at the base. Once the SF got into action the tide began to turn against the tigers.

The black tiger operational leader Lt. Col Ilango succumbed to injuries and died at 8. 30 am. At about 9 am Maj. Mathivathanan was killed. With that communication between the Wanni and combat zone ended. The fighting began subsiding gradually and finally ended at about 11. 30 am. Six tigers including the No two Lt. Col Veeman blew themselves up at the end. The Airbase was cleared of tigers who were in action for nearly eight hours. All 21 black tigers courted death as destined.

Wing Commander Amila Mohotti, Squadron Leader Ruwan Wijeratne, Flight Lieutenant A.B.M.Silva, Flying Officer S.R.Siyambalapitiya, Warrant Officer KPS Dayaratne, Corporal M.P.W. Deegalla, Corporal W.M.Warnakulasuriya, Corporal .M.W.Dissanayake, Corporal E.P.N. Dayaratne, Corporal Preethikumara, Lance Corporal H.E.N.D.Fernando, Lance Corporal Gunawardane of the Air Force and Lance Corporal R.J.S. Ratnayake of Gajaba Regiment of the Army paid the supreme sacrifice during the incident.

[Members of Sri Lanka’s Air Force march at a funeral procession of wing commander Amila Mohotti in Kurunagala, north central Sri Lanka, October 26, 2007 - Reuters Via Yahoo! News Pic: Anuruddha Lokuhapuarachchi]

Four of them died in a helicopter crash when it was rushing to help fighting troops at the base. One more Airman of the Air Force, Sergeant Asvedduma breathed his last late monday (22) night while being treated at Anuradhapura hospital after he was admitted with severe injuries. Accordingly, fourteen brave men of the Armed Forces perished as a result of the incident. A total of twenty two members of the Armed Forces are still receiving treatment in hospitals. About fifty - five are classified as walking wounded.

A large number of aircraft were destroyed or damaged. Peter Foster the Colombo correspondent of the “Daily Telegraph” of London has reported that the Black Tigers destroyed an expensive Beechcraft surveillance plane worth £14 million, two Mi17 helicopters, two Mi24 helicopters, three unmanned aerial vehicles, a K-8 jet and eight trainer aircraft.

The LTTE however says “officially” that only eight aircraft were destroyed. Rasiah Ilanthiraiyan the LTTE defence spokesperson explained this discrepancy to a Tamil journalist by saying that they had lost communication with the attack squad at 9 am. At that time eight was the figure. He said that subsequently more damage was done. It is indeed a strange situation when the LTTE claims a low figure while sections of the media and opposition quote a much higher figure.

The LTTE is exploiting the attack and sacrifice for propaganda purposes. Major Mathivathanan was given a special post-humous promotion and made Lt. Colonel. Ceremonies paying tribute to the twenty one “martyrs” were conducted in many parts of the Wanni. Incidently one of the black tiger bodies was not recovered as it was very badly mangled. The 20 recovered bodies were paraded in a naked state by the Anuradhapura Police and buried.

[LTTE cadres and civilians paying homage to the Black Tigers in Ki’linochchi - Photo: LTTEPS]

Let me conclude by quoting from a recent article on the attack by B. Raman, retired additional cabinet secretary of India. Raman is by no means an acolyte of the LTTE and has often criticised the tigers severely. This is what he had to say:

” Reliable details of the combined air and land attack launched by the LTTE on the Anuradhapura air base of the Sri Lankan Air Force early in the morning of October 22, 2007, indicate that it was neither an act of desperation as projected by the embarrassed Sri Lankan military spokesmen nor an act of needless dramatics as suggested by others. It was an act of unbelievable determination, bravery and precision successfully carried out by a 21-member suicide commando group of the Black Tigers-significantly led by a Tamil from the Eastern Province-with the back-up support of two planes of the so-called Tamil Eelam Air Force. ”

” Reliable Western sources say that no other terrorist organisation in the world would have been capable of organising such a raid, which had been preceded by painstaking intelligence collection, planning and rehearsal. The commandoes, divided into groups, infiltrated into the air base from two directions and, within 20 minutes, took the security guards by surprise, overwhelmed them, seized their weapons and communication equipment, neutralised a radar and an anti-aircraft gun position and then intimated their headquarters that they were in effective control of the air base. Only then the two aircraft of the LTTE’s air wing flew to Anuradhapura and dropped two bombs on the base and flew back safely to their hide-out.”

” The successful operation would seem to have been launched by the LTTE in retaliation for the recent operations of the Sri Lankan Navy against the transport ships of the LTTE and the air strikes of the SLAF over LTTE positions in the Northern Province. It once again underlines the LTTE’s reputation as an organisation with a tremendous tenacity of purpose, grit and sophistication in thinking and planning. Its recent set-backs have not weakened its morale. They have only redoubled its determination to keep fighting for its political objective unmindful of the losses in the Eastern Province.