The terrorists strike Mumbai at 9.30pm. Chief Minister Vilasrao Deshmukh is in Kerala. He is briefed about the attack on the city’s
prime locations. By the time Deshmukh grasps the enormity of the situation, 90 minutes have gone by.
He rings Union home minister Shivraj Patil at 11pm and asks for NSG commandos. "How many men?" Patil asks. "200," says the CM. Patil calls NSG chief J K Dutt and tells him to send 200 battle-ready commandos to Mumbai.
When NSG Men ready for their game, it is discovered that the only plane that can take 200 men, the IL 76, is not in Delhi but Chandigarh. Precious minutes are ticking by.
The IL 76 pilot is woken, the plane refuelled. It reaches Delhi at 2am. By the time the commandos get in and the plane takes off, four-and-a-half hours have elapsed. Experts say that unless a response is mounted within 30 minutes of an attack, the enemy can assume key defensive positions.
It takes the aircraft almost three hours to land at Mumbai airport. Unlike the Boeing and Airbus, IL 76 is a slow plane. By the time the NSG commandos board the waiting buses it is 5.25am.
The buses take another 40 minutes to reach the designated place in south Mumbai where the commandos are briefed, divided into different groups and sent out on their mission.
By the time they start their operation, it is 7am — in other words, nine-and-a-half hours after the terror strike.
Many lives might have been saved had this delay not happened. The obvious question is why is the NSG stationed only in Delhi. When Indian cities are vulnerable to terror attacks, why is there no commando force like the NSG, or its units, in other region commands?
Saturday, November 29, 2008
Deadly delay in calling the marine commandos
A disturbing truth is emanating from the 60-hour terror ordeal that left Mumbai angry and a nation stunned. The word is out that the marine commandos, better known as the Marcos, could have been called much earlier.
Indecision on the part of the state authorities delayed the operation of the naval special forces, according to official sources familiar with the situation.
A senior state police official called the Naval headquarters at Mumbai, asking for help, about an hour after the first round of gunfire. But it is believed that there was no formal request made for bringing in the Marcos. In fact, sources said, the concerned police official had initially told the Naval authorities, “We may need your help.” Only the state chief secretary has the formal authority to call in the Marcos.
What transpired between the police and the state administration is not known but by the time a formal request was put in, it was close to 2 am, according to these sources.
To make matters worse, when the Marcos reached the Taj there was no one to brief them. “They entered the Taj with absolutely no co-ordinates, no layout plan of the building, no briefing from any high ranking police official. The Taj is definitely not a place that jawans or officers visit on a daily basis. The could not afford to delay either since they could not afford to lose any more time in bringing the situation under control,” said sources on conditions of anonymity.
While the state had made the decision to call in the Army on late Wednesday evening, after the magnitude of the situation became clearer, implementation was slow. The National Security Guard (NSG) commandos had to be flown in from Delhi and were deployed on Thursday morning around 7 AM on Thursday morning. There have also been questions over what seems to be delays in the deployment of the NSG. But in case of NSG, they had to be flown in from Delhi.
In contrast the Marcos are located close to Mumbai, at Karanja, near Alibaug, and could have been deployed earlier, sources said.
No one knows how many more lives could have been saved if the Marcos had been called in immediately. On Saturday evening, the official toll released by the home ministry stood at 183-141 Indian civilians, 22 foreigners and 20 security personnel. The number though is expected to rise above 200 as the search is still on for some missing guests.
It’s also now surfaced that the terrorists were planning to kill thousands in Mumbai.
The terrorists had stockpiled enough ammunition for the task, including eight kilos of extremely potent RDX. At some point towards the end of the NSG operation, the terrorists lost their nerve and began arguing amongst themselves.
According to security sources, one of them was willing to surrender, while the other two were bent on a fight to the death. One of the terrorists even tried to negotiate his way to surrender. “But that was quite a risk. From earlier experiences we knew it could have been a trap,” said a security officer.
All the four terrorists in the Taj were eventually killed by the NSG in Operation Cyclone which ended around 8am on Saturday morning. The sources said all the four terrorists had posted themselves at important check points on different floors. They were keeping in touch through intercom and cell phones belonging to the hostages.
Two terrorists were gunned down by the NSG commandos on Friday while one was killed on Saturday morning around 3 am. The last of the terrorists was finally felled around 8am.
The bodies of the terrorists have been sent to the JJ Hospital for autopsy.
Indecision on the part of the state authorities delayed the operation of the naval special forces, according to official sources familiar with the situation.
A senior state police official called the Naval headquarters at Mumbai, asking for help, about an hour after the first round of gunfire. But it is believed that there was no formal request made for bringing in the Marcos. In fact, sources said, the concerned police official had initially told the Naval authorities, “We may need your help.” Only the state chief secretary has the formal authority to call in the Marcos.
What transpired between the police and the state administration is not known but by the time a formal request was put in, it was close to 2 am, according to these sources.
To make matters worse, when the Marcos reached the Taj there was no one to brief them. “They entered the Taj with absolutely no co-ordinates, no layout plan of the building, no briefing from any high ranking police official. The Taj is definitely not a place that jawans or officers visit on a daily basis. The could not afford to delay either since they could not afford to lose any more time in bringing the situation under control,” said sources on conditions of anonymity.
While the state had made the decision to call in the Army on late Wednesday evening, after the magnitude of the situation became clearer, implementation was slow. The National Security Guard (NSG) commandos had to be flown in from Delhi and were deployed on Thursday morning around 7 AM on Thursday morning. There have also been questions over what seems to be delays in the deployment of the NSG. But in case of NSG, they had to be flown in from Delhi.
In contrast the Marcos are located close to Mumbai, at Karanja, near Alibaug, and could have been deployed earlier, sources said.
No one knows how many more lives could have been saved if the Marcos had been called in immediately. On Saturday evening, the official toll released by the home ministry stood at 183-141 Indian civilians, 22 foreigners and 20 security personnel. The number though is expected to rise above 200 as the search is still on for some missing guests.
It’s also now surfaced that the terrorists were planning to kill thousands in Mumbai.
The terrorists had stockpiled enough ammunition for the task, including eight kilos of extremely potent RDX. At some point towards the end of the NSG operation, the terrorists lost their nerve and began arguing amongst themselves.
According to security sources, one of them was willing to surrender, while the other two were bent on a fight to the death. One of the terrorists even tried to negotiate his way to surrender. “But that was quite a risk. From earlier experiences we knew it could have been a trap,” said a security officer.
All the four terrorists in the Taj were eventually killed by the NSG in Operation Cyclone which ended around 8am on Saturday morning. The sources said all the four terrorists had posted themselves at important check points on different floors. They were keeping in touch through intercom and cell phones belonging to the hostages.
Two terrorists were gunned down by the NSG commandos on Friday while one was killed on Saturday morning around 3 am. The last of the terrorists was finally felled around 8am.
The bodies of the terrorists have been sent to the JJ Hospital for autopsy.
Highly trained and motivated
NSG and marine commandos (marcos) involved in the operations at the Taj and the Oberoi-Trident hotels described the terrorists as well trained in military and commando methods and very familiar with the layouts of the two hotels.
“They were more sophisticated than militants encountered even in Jammu & Kashmir,” an NSG commando who took part in the operation at the Taj told DNA. “Initially we could not comprehend whether we were up against a bunch of motivated terrorists or trained commandos of another army,” another NSG commando told DNA. “The extent of ammunition carried by the terrorists initially overwhelmed us,” the commando from Haryana, who spoke to DNA on condition of anonymity, said.
According to him, the terrorists did not act like a bunch of desperate fidayeen, but gave every indication of having undergone intensive commando training.
The officer, who returned to the Taj early on Friday morning, spoke to DNA a little after 2am. His motivation was to highlight the challenges being faced by the security forces.
A marco also described the terrorists as determined to spread terror, without any sign of remorse. “The manner in which they would throw grenades and fire from different locations at the hotels showed their familiarity with the layout. They must have carried out a survey earlier,” said the masked commando of MARCOS, India’s lethal Marine Commando Force. “The terrorists were equipped with 7 fully loaded ammunition magazines plus 400 spare rounds of bullets. Not everyone can operate such a sophisticated AK series.”
The first commando gave other indicators of the sophistication of the terrorists. “Their style of operation did not correspond to our existing knowledge of terrorist operations in any part of India, including Jammu and Kashmir. Unlike ultras who tend to get desperate with receding ammunition, the firing pattern of the terrorists showed a well-thought- out strategy,” he said.
“The NSG’s strategy was to tire out the militants before sleep deprivation crept in,” the commando said. Unfortunately, this was another aspect of a commando operation that the militants seemed well acquainted with.
“Sleep deprivation training is sophisticated. Commandos are taught the art of keeping their eyes open for as long as a week without any visible signs of mental fatigue. These militants appeared well-trained in mental exercises to ward off sleepiness and also carried specific drugs that help,” the commando said.
The commando also pointed out that while they had gone into the operation with the knowledge that the enemy knew its way around the hotel, the extent of this knowledge only became apparent later. “Even if they had a map or had visited the hotel some time earlier, the way they were operating meant they had memorised everything. It is difficult to imagine militants being trained to such levels.”
The marine commandos, who were the first to enter the hotels, were also hampered by the risk of injuring the many guests trapped inside. “The men had to literally feel their way through the pitch dark hotel corridors and rooms,” said the marine commando, who gave the first account of the operation to the media on Friday.
When they arrived at the Taj hotel, the terrorists lobbed grenades from the seventh or eighth floor. “We thereafter heard gunshots on the second floor and we rushed (there). We found 12 to 15 bodies there. At that point of time, we also came under fire. When we retaliated, the terrorists hurled grenades at us.
Fortunately, we could take cover and were unhurt,” the commando said. “Once the firing stopped, we found the terrorists had vanished and gone elsewhere, which showed they knew the hotel layout well.”
Two commandos were injured, one of them seriously, in this encounter. In addition to ammunition, the commandos recovered a Mauritius national’s identity card and Chinese-made hand grenades, seven credit cards of different banks, dry rations and $1,200 and Rs6,840 from the rucksack of a terrorist.
Security officials said the men, described by eyewitnesses as “just like boys dressed in cargo pants and T-shirts with rucksacks across their shoulders”, were a highly motivated and determined group. Split into small groups, they created panic by first attacking crowded locations before focusing their assault on the two five-star hotels and an office-cum-residential building housing a Jewish centre.
“They were more sophisticated than militants encountered even in Jammu & Kashmir,” an NSG commando who took part in the operation at the Taj told DNA. “Initially we could not comprehend whether we were up against a bunch of motivated terrorists or trained commandos of another army,” another NSG commando told DNA. “The extent of ammunition carried by the terrorists initially overwhelmed us,” the commando from Haryana, who spoke to DNA on condition of anonymity, said.
According to him, the terrorists did not act like a bunch of desperate fidayeen, but gave every indication of having undergone intensive commando training.
The officer, who returned to the Taj early on Friday morning, spoke to DNA a little after 2am. His motivation was to highlight the challenges being faced by the security forces.
A marco also described the terrorists as determined to spread terror, without any sign of remorse. “The manner in which they would throw grenades and fire from different locations at the hotels showed their familiarity with the layout. They must have carried out a survey earlier,” said the masked commando of MARCOS, India’s lethal Marine Commando Force. “The terrorists were equipped with 7 fully loaded ammunition magazines plus 400 spare rounds of bullets. Not everyone can operate such a sophisticated AK series.”
The first commando gave other indicators of the sophistication of the terrorists. “Their style of operation did not correspond to our existing knowledge of terrorist operations in any part of India, including Jammu and Kashmir. Unlike ultras who tend to get desperate with receding ammunition, the firing pattern of the terrorists showed a well-thought- out strategy,” he said.
“The NSG’s strategy was to tire out the militants before sleep deprivation crept in,” the commando said. Unfortunately, this was another aspect of a commando operation that the militants seemed well acquainted with.
“Sleep deprivation training is sophisticated. Commandos are taught the art of keeping their eyes open for as long as a week without any visible signs of mental fatigue. These militants appeared well-trained in mental exercises to ward off sleepiness and also carried specific drugs that help,” the commando said.
The commando also pointed out that while they had gone into the operation with the knowledge that the enemy knew its way around the hotel, the extent of this knowledge only became apparent later. “Even if they had a map or had visited the hotel some time earlier, the way they were operating meant they had memorised everything. It is difficult to imagine militants being trained to such levels.”
The marine commandos, who were the first to enter the hotels, were also hampered by the risk of injuring the many guests trapped inside. “The men had to literally feel their way through the pitch dark hotel corridors and rooms,” said the marine commando, who gave the first account of the operation to the media on Friday.
When they arrived at the Taj hotel, the terrorists lobbed grenades from the seventh or eighth floor. “We thereafter heard gunshots on the second floor and we rushed (there). We found 12 to 15 bodies there. At that point of time, we also came under fire. When we retaliated, the terrorists hurled grenades at us.
Fortunately, we could take cover and were unhurt,” the commando said. “Once the firing stopped, we found the terrorists had vanished and gone elsewhere, which showed they knew the hotel layout well.”
Two commandos were injured, one of them seriously, in this encounter. In addition to ammunition, the commandos recovered a Mauritius national’s identity card and Chinese-made hand grenades, seven credit cards of different banks, dry rations and $1,200 and Rs6,840 from the rucksack of a terrorist.
Security officials said the men, described by eyewitnesses as “just like boys dressed in cargo pants and T-shirts with rucksacks across their shoulders”, were a highly motivated and determined group. Split into small groups, they created panic by first attacking crowded locations before focusing their assault on the two five-star hotels and an office-cum-residential building housing a Jewish centre.
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